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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CECIL L. LYNCH,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

J. A. HOGLE, J. E. HOGLE, et al,
doing business as J. A. HOGLE &

Case No.
8022

co.,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

PRELIThiiNARY STATEMENT
This is a suit wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover
the value of 40 shares of stock alleged to have been converted by the defendants. The plaintiff will hereinafter
be referred to as "Lynch", the defendants as "J. A.
Hogle & Co", and Richard C. Badger as "Badger". The
evidence showed that Badger was an independent broker
with his principal place of business at Ogden, Utah; that
Lynch was a resident of Ogden and a customer of
Badger; that all of Lynch's stock transactions including
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that involving the 40 shares were made direct by Lynch
with Badger in the Ogden office of Badger; that Badger
had an Omnibus Account with J. A. Hogle & Co. but
there was no privity of contract nor any business dealingH whatsoever between Lynch and J. A. Hogle & Co.
Badger took his own life on ~larch 27, 1951 (R. 40).
George C. :Maw was appointed Administrator of Badger's
estate. Subsequently an audit of the accounts of Badger
showed (Exhibit 6, Schedule A-2) that Badger was short
~ ew York stocks belonging to his customers of a value
exceeding One-half ).Iillion Dollars; that Badger had
been a crook and his estate insolvent (R. 57) ; that plaintiff as one of Badger's customers had been defrauded by
Badger along with numerous other customers of Badger.
The case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van
Cott, Jr., sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of
plaintiff's case, the Trial Court found that J. A. Hogle
& Co. was neither legally nor equitably responsible for

Badger's wrongdoing and the Court granted defendants'
1notion for disn1issal upon the merits pursuant to Rule
41(b).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Finding of Fact No. 2 summarizes the nature of
Badger's business as follows:
"2.

That one Richard C. Badger, as a sole proprietor, for some years immediately preceeding his death on March 27, 1951, was engaged,
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under the nmne of Richard C. Badger & Co.,
in a general brokerage business dealing in
stocks and bonds and other securities; that
the principal place of business of Richard C.
Badger was Ogden, Utah, where as such
broker he maintained the usual broker's facilities and offices 'vith board room for customers showing listed stocks on the New York
Stock Exchange and on the Salt Lake Stock
E.xchange, equipped with Western Union
ticker service direct from the New York
Stock Exchange, \vith electrical equipment (a
translux) so installed to move in illuminated
manner the ticker tape across a lighted screen
so as to show to customers of Richard C.
Badger sitting in the board room quotations
and trades in New York stocks as such information came over the Western Union ticker
service; that Richard C. Badger was a member of the Salt Lake Stock Exchange where
he transacted a large volume of business;
that in addition to transactions in listed
stocks, Richard C. Badger conducted a general business in 'over-the-counter' securities
and dealt directly with banks and brokerage
houses in Chicago, Illinois, in New Jersey
and elsewhere; that as such broker he was a
direct competitor with the defendants, and as
such competitor took care to see that his
customers were not disclosed to the defendants; that the general books of Richard C.
Badger & Co. were kept and maintained in
the Ogden office of Richard C. Badger & Co.
and the principal bank account of Richard C.
Badger & Co. was kept and maintained with
First Security Bank of Utah N. A. at Ogden,
Utah." (R. 185)
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Badger had a large business with active customers'
accounts exceeding 500 (R. 66). Badger dealt with
numerous stockbrokers, banks and e..xclianges throughout
the United States. Because Badger did not have a seat
on the New York Stock Exchange, it was necessary that
he buy New York stocks through a member of the New
York Exchange and for this purpose Badger, in November of 1949 (R. 168), established an Omnibus Account
with J. A. Hogle & Co. at Salt Lake City. J. A. Hogle &
Co. charged Badger full commissions on all trades just
as J. A. Hogle & Co. did with any other customer (R.
170). In addition to the Omnibus Account, Badger established at J. A. Hogle & Co. a personal account in which
Badger pledged local mining stocks to secure money borrowed by him.

J. A. Hogle & Co. paid no bills of Badger, furnished
him no facilities, and shared no profits or losses with
Badger ( R. 146). In all respects Badger was an independent broker and so operated his business.
With respect to the defendants the Court found:
"3.

That the defendants, J. A. Hogle, J. E. Hogle,
et al., are now and at all times hereinafter
mentioned, were engaged in the brokerage
business as co-partners under the name of J.
A. Hogle & Co., with their principle place of
business at Salt Lake City, Utah, but with
branch brokerage· offices at Ogden, Utah,
New York City and elsewhere; that as such
brokers they have a membership in the New
York Stock Exchange and are eligible to
transact business on that exchange." (R. 185)
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The evidence shows (&"Xhibit L) that Hogle maintains his principal offiee at Salt Lake City 'vi th branch
offices at Los Angele:::;, Beverly Hills, Riverside, Reno,
Spokane, San Diego, Denver, Boulder, Ogden, New York
City, Butte and ~[issoula (R. 130). In this connection
Hogle is one of the largest stockbrokers in the western
Fnited States. At all of these places of business there
are trades in K ew York stocks, including stock of
Standard Oil of California.
While Lynch, the plaintiff, was not an extensive
trader, yet as a custon1er of Badger, he did know his way
around Badger's brokerage office. He would sit in the
chairs in the board room and watch the quotations as
they passed on the translux. He knew the Badger physical layout, knew its staff and its machines (R. 19). He
had traded before. He knew that Badger had a direct
service through vVestern Union from the New York Stock
Exchange on which Badger obtained New York quotations. He knew Badger's bookkeeper and cashier (R. 20).
Lynch had purchased in September and in October of
1950 New York stocks through Badger and Badger had
been slow to deliver the certificates to Lynch (R. 22).

"Q.

Yes. It took from September 7th until October 17th before you actually received the
American Telephone and Telegraph stock
that you had bought?

A. Yes sir.
Q. During that period of time you trusted Mr.
Badger to deliver those stocks to you, didn't
you~
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A.

Well, I jogged his memory several times. I
told him I was getting kind of nervous, I
wanted my stock.

Q.

You were getting a little bit nervous about
him were you 1 He was slow in making those
deliveries 1

A.

I thought so.

Q.

Now calling your attention to these forty
shares of General Motors which you purchased and paid for on November 9, 1950,
when did you get that stock 1

A.

It shows delivered February 5th. That is, as
near as I can tell, that's correct.

Q. February 5, 1951. So you didn't get your

~\.

General Motors stock, even though you had
paid for it, until February 5, 1951, notwithstanding the fact that you had paid for it on
November 9, 1950, is that right~
Yes sir." (R. 22) (See also defendants' Exhibit 1.)

THE FoRTY SHARE STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA TRANSACTION.

"\Vith specific reference to the transaction wherein
Lynch directed Badger to purchase 40 shares of Standard
Oil of California stock the evidence showed: that on
March 15, 1951 Lynch directed Badger to buy 40 shares
but did not pay Badger any money at that time; that on
~Iarch 15th Badger wired J. A. Hogle & Co. to buy for
Badger's Omnibus Account at the market 40 shares; that
pursuant to Badger's wire, J. A. Hogle & Co. instructed
its New York office to buy the 40 shares; that the 40
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shares were purchas~·d on the New York Bxchange; and
that in due course J. A. Hogle & Co. advised Badger of
the purchase. Exhibit L con1prises the original documents showing the instructions from Badger to J. A.
Hogle & Co. to purchase the 40 shares and the advice
giYen by J. A. Hogle & Co. to Badger that the shares had
been purchased on ~I arch 15th and that the Omnibus
Account of R. C. Badger & Co. had been charged with the
purchase. Exhibit C shows that after Badger was
advised by J. ~\. Hogle & Co. of the purchase then
Badger billed Lynch. On the following day i.e. March
16th, Lynch paid Badger by cashier's check, Exhibit A.
Exhibit E is the original purchase slip wherein J. A.
Hogle & Co. advised Badger of the purchase. This
E~.hibit shows that 40 shares of Standard Oil of California stock were purchased at 44% for the account of
R. C. Badger & Co., Post Office Box 968, Ogden, Utah.
Exhibit 8 covering R. C. Badger & Co.'s transactions in
Standard Oil of California stock also shows the 40 share
purchase, the date of the purchase on Exhibit 8 being
entered as :Jfarch 20th. The last named date is the settlelnent date but both Exhibits relate to the same transaction. In other words, the purchase was made on March
15th and Badger's Omnibus Account charged with the
amount of the purchase plus the usual commissions, and
the 40 shares ca1ne into the Omnibus Account in the
ordinary broker-to-broker Omnibus Account transaction.
This purchase was made on the strength of the securities
in the Omnibus Account and on an axtension of credit in
that account to Badger hy J. A. Hogle & Co. In connecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion with this extension of credit, it will be noted that
Badger was doing business on a large scale. Exhibit G
shows that Badger through his Omnibus Account obtained credit from J. A. Hogle & Co. at times exceeding
Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000) Dollars. Exhibit 13
shows that in attaining this large credit, Badger had
pledged with J. A. Hogle & Co. in the Omnibus Account
stocks having a value far &.1weeding the amount Badger
owed J. A. Hogle & Co. Exhibit 13 shows that on settleInent date March 16th the additional amount that J. A.
Hogle & Co. might have loaned against the securities over
and above the amount actually owed to be Forty-Two
Thousand, One Hundred Eighty-Five and 92/100 ($42,185.92) Dollars. Also see in this connection Exhibits 12
to 16 inclusive.
At the close of the business day (March 15th), J. A.
Hogle & Co.'s New York office had received orders from
all of the J. A. Hogle & Co.'s western offices for the purchase of a total of 153 shares of Standard Oil stock.
(Defs' Exhibit 10, R. 8-1 & 85). In making these purchases J. A. Hogle & Co. cleared the round lot of 100
shares through the Stock Clearing Corporation and the
two odd lots were settled through the odd lot broker. To
cover the two odd lots, J. A. Hogle & Co. received from
the odd lot broker one certificate for 50 shares and one
certificate for three shares. All certificates were issued
in the name of J. A. Hogle & Co. (Exhibit 10, R. 131).
When stock is held in the name of the broker (J. A. Hogle
& Co.) it is designated as street stock. No certificate for
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any amount of Standard Oil 8tock was ever 1nade or
i~sued in the na1ne of plaintiff or Badger. No certificate
for 40 8hare~ ever cmne into a~istence as plaintiff erroneously implies by the statement at page 3 of his brief that
"there was actually held by Hogle the 40 shares thus
purchased.'' :Jir. Nimnoth, cashier of J. A. Hogle & Co.,
testified there was never any 40 share certificate issued
either to J. A. Hogle & Co., to Badger or to Lynch (R.
S-t & 85); that any purchase less than 100 shares had to
be consummated on the New York Exchange through the
odd lot broker and that it is the practice on the Exchange
at the end of the trading day to settle with the odd lot
broker on the basis of net balances, and on :March 15,
1951 this settlement was made with the odd lot brokers
by those brokers delivering to J. A. Hogle & Co. one
certificate for 50 shares and one certificate for 3 shares
of stock of Standard Oil of California. In other words, at
the close of business on ~Iarch 15th, the net balance
showed the odd lot broker owed J. A. Hogle & Co. 53
shares of Standard Oil of California stock (R. 84 to

87).
On

~iarch

24, 1951 Badger wired J. A. Hogle & Co.

to sell 50 shares of Standard Oil of California stock at
the market and pursuant to Badger's order and on that
day, J. A. Hogle & Co. sold 50 shares at 46Vs and credited
Badger's 01nnibus Account with Two Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty-One and 82/100 ($2,281.82) Dollars as
the amount received on the sale. Exhibit 9 consisting of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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three papers shows the telegraphic instructions from
Badger to J. A. Hogle & Co. and J. A. Hogle & Co.'s
report of the sale to Badger.
This Exhibit (No. 9) comprises the original documents which passed between Badger's Ogden Office
and Hogle's Salt Lake Office with regard to the 50
~hare

transaction. The blue sheet contains the ticker

tape reading RB No.4 OP sell 50 SD MKT, 50-MKT-S.
:Mr. Niemoth testified that RB meant Badger, the No.4
1neanf it was the fourth transaction of Badger's that
day through the Hogle Office; that OP means an open
order (an order that is good until filled or cancelled),
that SD are the code letters for Standard Stock and
)IKT means market. The white sheet attached shows
that Hogle reported to Badger that pursuant to Badger's
order, J. A. Hogle & Co. had sold for the account of
Badger the 50 shares. The white sheet shows the commission charged Badger, the New York and Federal
T&xes and the net amount as Twenty-Two Hundred
Eighty-One and 21/100 ($2,281.21) Dollars. Exhibit No.
9 shows nothing but the ordinary transaction in the
Omnibus Account and nowhere are 40 shares or Lynch's
name mentioned. Mr. Niemoth testified (R. 165) that
tlie 50 shares were sold pursuant to the written order
(Exhibit No.9) of Mr. Badger and the proceeds from the
sale credited to Badger's Omnibus Account in the ordinary course of business.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Exhibit 8 covering all of the Standard Oil of California transactions of Badger subsequent to December
31, 1950, shows a sale of 50 shares under date of March
2S, 1951 but the last named date was the settlement date
and not the trade date. The actual sale was made March
2-1, 1951 as evidenced by Exhibit 9. Lynch argues in his
brief that the sale of 50 shares constituted an unauthorized
sale by J~ A. Hogle & Co. of the 40 shares which Lynch
had ordered frmn Badger. It is obvious from E&hibits
L, 8, and 9 and from testimony of Mr. Niemoth (R. 122,
125 & 126) that the 50 share sale had no reference to
Lynch nor to any 40 share certificate of stock. The 50
share transaction was pursuant to Badger's written
instructions to sell securities in his Omnibus Account.
As the Court can see, no shares of stock were ever
earmarked as belonging to Lynch, and it is obviously
impossible to determine whose 50 shares of stock Badger
ordered J. A. Hogle & Co. to sell on March 24, 1951. For
all that is known by the parties to this lawsuit, one of
the other 500 customers of Badger may have directed
him to sell the 50 shares and may have received the proceeds from such sale. However, for the sole purpose of
argument before this Court and for the sake of clarity in
nomenclature, let it be assumed that the purchase by Badger of 40 shares on JYiarch 15th and the sale of 50 shares
on March 24th involved Lynch's stock. As respondents
will point out hereafter, such is not the fact nor the law,
but it is the basis of plaintiff's claim of conversion, and
yet upon such basis, the Trial Court found J. A. Hogle
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& Co. to be an innocent pledgee for value and under the
principle of equitable estoppel that plaintiff is not
entitled to recover.
From time to time Badger would draw on his Omnibus Account and receive checks of J. A. Hogle & Co.
These checks were charged against the account in the
ordinary course of business. At times Badger would
give his check to J. A. Hogle & Co. for credit to the
account. Badger knew that he must keep the account
adequately margined or the securities in the account
would be sold to pay the indebtedness of the account.
Sometimes this giving and receiving of checks would
occur simultaneously. This was necessitated, however,
by the fact that Badger "·as in need of "federal funds"
with which to pay drafts drawn on him, through the
Federal Reserve Bank, by banks and brokers in distant
-cities who were sending securities for delivery to Badger
upon payment of the drafts covering the purchase price
of the securities (R. 143 to 145). The Rules of the F'ederal Reserve Bank would not permit the Federal Reserve
to accept checks drawn on a bank. The Rules required
that the Federal Reserve Bank receive federal funds
before surrendering the securities. Federal funds could
only be obtained by Badger going to a private bank, a
member of the Federal Reserve System, and obtaining
from the bank a draft drawn on the Federal Reserve
against the account of the bank maintained with the
Federal Reserve. The evidence also disclosed (R. 145)
that there were occasions when securities were sent by
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banks or brokers in distant cities to a Salt Lake City bank
for delivery upon payn1ent of the sight draft attached
and that in those instances the Salt Lake City bank would
not surrender the securities to Badger without receiving
Salt Lake City funds. In other words, Badger maintaining his principal bank account with the First Security
Bank in Ogden, Utah, had to have possession of Salt
Lake City funds or federal funds before he could obtain
delivery in Salt Lake City. During the full period of
time that J. A. Hogle & Co. dealt with Badger, every
check given by Badger to J. A. Hogle & Co. was paid
promptly and in due course by the bank upon which it
was drawn, with one exception. That exception is the
check dated J\1arch 24, 1951 given by Badger to J. A.
Hogle & Co. three days before Badger took his life. The
check was for Thirty-Four Thousand ($34,000) Dollars
and drawn on the First Security Bank at Ogden.
This check was returned in due course by the Ogden
bank to J. A. Hogle & Co. marked "maker deceased" and
"insufficient funds." When the Thirty-Four Thousand
($34,000) Dollar check was initially received by J. A.
Hogle & Co. on J\1arch 24th, it was credited to the Omnibus Account in the ordinary course of business (Exhibit
H). At the time the check was so received by J. A. Hogle
& Co., J. A. Hogle & Co. gave Badger their check drawn
on Walker Bank & Trust Company (Exhibits H & 2) in
the amount of Thirty-Two Thousand ($32,000) Dollars.
Badger liad represented to J. A. Hogle & Co. that Badger
was in need of federal funds to pay for securities shipped
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to him through the Federal Reserve Bank. This check
(&wibit 2) is endorsed: "For Federal Reserve Draft,
R. C. Badger & Co.-Badger." This was the last transaction that J. A. Hogle & Co. had with Badger. With
reference to these check transactions, 1lr. Niemoth testified (R. 1+2 to 1+~) that in no single instance was
the Omnibus Account ever under-margined and that
Badger was entitled to draw in money on the account
any excess margins; that such is the common practice in
the brokerage business. \\~ith specific reference to the
last transaction :\Ir. Niemoth said:

"Q.

Now if you should today take this Exhibit
and deduct, or charge Badger, with the $34,000 which represented the check which
bounced, state whether or not you would still
have in the account adequate margins and
there would be an excess in the account which
might be loaned~

A.

Yes, that is correct.

Q.

That is true whether you would apply this
check to the $44,161.01, which was the excess
in the omnibus account, or whether you would
apply it to the $42,947.09 in the firm account~

A.

Yes, that is correct.

Q.

Now assume that Badger had not even given
you a check for $34,000 on March 24th. Would
the account have been adequately margined~

A. Yes, it would; yes, it would." (R. 143)
EMibits 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 show in detail the
status of Badger's Omnibus Account with the marginal
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requirements at all times and the excess n1argin in the
account. 'These Exhibits show that at no time was the
account under-n1argined and that Badger was free to
draw in n1oney the excess margins at his volition (H. 134
to 143).
With reference to J. A. Hogle & Co. giving Badger
immediate credit in the Omnibus Account for checks of
Badger drawn on his Ogden bank account, the evidence
shows this to be strictly in accordance with Regulation
"T" (Exhibit 7, pages 13 and 14) of the Federal Reserve
System relating to brokers' Omnibus Accounts. Such
ilnmediate credit is fully in accord with the customs and
practices of the brokerage business (R. 143 to 146) where
there must be dispatch and finality in all transactions.
Float and uncertainty in the time of axecution of transactions in brokers' accounts would paralyze the business
where even hourly changes are of large consequence.
Lynch on l\farch 16th delivered to Badger a cashier's
check endorsed in negotiable form as payment for the 40
shares of Standard Oil stock. Badger never did "order
out" the 40 shares for Lynch, but Badger appropriated
the cashier's check to Badger's own use. Badger was
an embezzler and on March 27, 1951, his body was found
in his garage. It is common knowledge that he committed
suicide (R. 40). The Certified Public Accountants' audit
of the affairs of Richard C. Badger & Co. (Defs' Exhibit
6) shows that Badger was short New York stocks in the
amount of Five Hundred Twenty-Six Thousand, Nine
Thousand Eleven and 43/100 ( $526,911.43) Dollars.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Regarding the business relationship of J. A. Hogle
& Co. with Badger and Hogle's good faith, the Trial
Court found:

''11. That the business relationship between
Richard C. Badger & Co. and J. A. Hogle & Co.,
and between Richard C. Badger personally and
the individual partners of J. A. Hogle & Co., was
the ordinary broker-to-broker business relationship with the parties dealing at arms length and
in the ordinary course of business; that J. A.
Hogle & Co., paid no expenses of the firm of
Richard C. Badger & Co.; that J. A. Hogle & Co.
charged Richard C. Badger & Co. full commissions on all transactions; that Richard C. Badger
& Co. paid for all teletype service, wire service
and other facilities used by his firm, and that no
part thereof was furnished or paid for by J. A.
Hogle & Co.; that Richard C. Badger & Co. maintained its own staff consisting of the usual personnel of brokerage offices, i.e., board markers,
cashier, bookkeepers, teletype operators, etc.; that
J. A. Hogle & Co. did not share profits with
Richard C. Badger & Co. nor did it participate in
the management or conduct of the firm of Richard
C. Badger & Co., or in the determination of the
policies of that firm.
"12. That J. A. Hogle & Co. did nothing
whatever to deceive, mislead or impair the rights
of plaintiff, and that Richard C. Badger & Co.
did not hold itself out to its customers as being the
agent or representative of J. A. Hogle & Co.; that
Richard C. Badger & Co. &-xJpressly represented
to plaintiff that Richard C. Badger & Co. dealt
directly with the New York Stock Exchange and
not through any other person, firm or corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion; that the loss sustained by the plaintiff did not
result fron1 any act or neglect of J. A. Hogle, J. E.
Hogle or any other partners of the firm of J. A.
Hogle & Co., and that J. A. Hogle & Co. had no
knowledge that Richard C. Badger or the firm of
Richard C. Badger & Co. was in financial difficulties prior to the time that Badger died on
~Iarch 27, 1951."
ARGU:JIENT AND ALITHORITIES
POINT I. UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL LYNCH l\IUST BEAR THE LOSS OF HIS MISPLACED TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN HIS AGENT,
BADGER.

The Trial Court found the facts against the plaintiff and there was overwhelming evidence to support
the Court's findings.
THE LEADING CASE

The Court granted defendants' motion for dismissal
on the basis of Korns v. Thornpson & McKinnon, 22 F.
Supp. 442 which was cited to and read in its entirety by
the Court (R. 182). The Korns case relies upon Austin
v. Hayden, 171 Mich. 38, 137 N.W. 317. These two cases
constitute the two leading authorities upon the factual
situation now before this Court. Plaintiff has not cited
nor attempted to distinguish these decisions for their
conclusive determination of the present case can plainly
be seen. The decisions are well reasoned and set out at
length the relationship of a customer to an initial broker
and to the carrying broker on the New York Exchange.
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In those decisions it is pointed out that when a customer
purchases New York stocks he is deemed to know that
such stocks can only be purchased by a stockbroker having a seat on the New York Exchange and that it always
is necessary and is customary practice for hrokers not
having a seat on such Exchange to forward the purchase
orders to a carrying broker.
Trial Judge Ray Van Cott Jr. in granting the motion to dismiss stated the decision in Korns v. Thomson
& JlcKimum, supra, covered about every point made
by counsel for Lynch. The l{orns case is so comprehensive and in point that Judge Van Cott felt it to be.
decisive. \Ve particularly invite the Supreme Court's
attention to the Korns decision. There the defendants
Thomson and ::\icKinnon, a co-partnership, engaged in
business (similar to that of J. A. I-Iogle & Co.) as stockbrokers, the partners having seats on the New York
Stock Elxchange and on other Exchanges. Their principal office was in New York City with branch offices
elsewhere. A brokerage firm at Des Moines, Iowa, known
as Harper Strauss & Company, (and situated similarly
to Richard A. Badger & Co. in this case), operated a
stock brokerage business in Iowa. The Iowa brokers
had no seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Thomson
& McKinnon, the New York brokers, handled a large
volume of business from the Iowa firm executing orders
for the purchase and sale of stocks and commodities.
The stocks involved in the suit had been purchased by
the New York firm pursuant to orders of the Iowa firm.
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The account of the K ew York broker with the Iowa
broker would be debited and credited as purchases and
~ales were n1ade on the New York Stoek Exchange. It
was the custom for stock certificates evidencing such
purchases to be carried in the nan1e of the New York
firn1 i.e., as street certificates, until such time as "ordered
out.'' The Iowa brokerage firm becmne bankrupt. Thereafter, Korns and nun1erous other customers of the bankrupt firn1 sued the Ke'v York brokers (Thomson & :McICinnon) claiming securities in the stock account in New
York belonged to the plaintiffs and had been converted
by the defendants and also claiming that the relationship between the hYo brokerage firms made the New
York firm liable for the Iowa firm's defaults. As to
Korns' clain1, the evidence showed that Korns had directed the Iowa brokers to buy 100 shares of United
States Steel stock at $65.50 per share. The Iowa brokers
directed the K ew York brokers to buy the stock and this
was done on the Nww York Exchange pursuant to that
order. Korns was advised by the Iowa brokers of the
purchase and thereupon paid them for the stock. The
shares were held by the New York broker in his account
with the Iowa broker. !Corns sued the New York broker
for conversion of the stock. The Court's opinion states:
"When the plaintiff and his assignors caused
their orders for the purchase of certain stocks to
be given to Harper Strauss & Co. they understood,
or should have understood, that the orders were for
e..xecution in the New York Stock Exchange. They
knew, or should have known, the relation of HarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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per Strauss & Co. to this Exchange, and its mode
of transacting business therein through other
brokerage houses. They must be held to have
contemplated and authorized a course of dealing
in accordance with the rules and customs of the
New York Stock Exchange.
"'A person dealing at a particular market
\vill be taken to have dealt according to the known
general customs and usages of that market; and,
if he employs others to act for him in buying and
selling at such market, he will be held as intending that the business should be conducted according to such general usage and custom of such market; and this has been held to be the rule whether
he in fact knows of the custom or not.' Samuels
v. Oliver, 130 Ill. 73, 22 N.E. 499, 500. See, also,
Taylor v. Bailey, 169 Ill. 181, 48 N.E. 200. To the
same effect is the case of Skiff v. Stoddard, 63
Conn. 198, 26 A. 874, 28 A. 104, 21 L.R.A. 102."
Lynch testified that he knew Standard Oil of California was a New York stock and must be purchased
on the New York Stock Exchange.
"Q.

You knew that those stocks were listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, didn't you~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

That was the place where :\Ir. Badger would
have to obtain them for you~

A.

I suppose so.

Q. Well, calling your attention to Plaintiff's
E.xhibit 6, what do the words, 'NYSE' mean
to you1
A.

New York Stock Exchange.
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Q.

That tells you that that has been purchased
on the New York Stock Exchange, does it
not?

A.

That i8 what it says.

Q. And that is \vhat you knew Mr. Badger would
do with reference to the purchase of the
Standard Oil of California stock, did you not f
A.

I expected him to." (R. 24 & 25).

The general rule is stated in the annotation in 79
A.L.R. at page 59:2 as follows:
"As a general rule, subject to certain limitations, a customer who engages a broker to execute an order on a stock or produce a.xchange
confers authority on such broker to conduct the
transaction according to the rules and established
customs of the exchange on which he deals, and
the customer is thereby bound by such rules and
customs, even though he does not have actual
knowledge of them."
Thus it can be seen that Lynch authorized or is deemed
to have authorized Badger to deal with a broker having
a seat on the N e·w York Stock Exchange when he directed
Badger to purchase Standard Oil of California, a New
York stock.
Concerning the question of "ownership" of stock,
the Court in the Korns case 1nade the following observation:
"It is claimed by the plaintiff that there was
a conversion of the stocks and securities. The
stocks and securities never became the property
of the plavrdiff. There was a conversion by HarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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]Jer Strauss & Co. (the initial broker) of the
moneys which had been paid to that company by
the plaintiff and his assignors for the p1.trchase
of the stocks. There was a want of good faith on
the part of, and fraud practiced by, Harper
Strauss & Co. on its customers, but does this want
of good faith and fraud on the part of Harper
Strauss & Co. affect the defendants (the carrying
broker) in any respect~ Under all the authorities
called to the attention of the court, a presumption
attached that the defendants, having come into
the possession of the securities lawfully, had the
right to sell them to protect their lien rights thereon." (Emphasis added.)
The Court goes on to point out with meticulous care
(page -!-t-9) that the plaintiff was the customer of the
initial broker; that the relationship of customer and
broker never existed between plaintiff and defendant;
that the securities in question were never in the hands
or under the control of plaintiff.
"The fact that Harper Strauss & Co. had
received payment from plaintiff and his assignors
to cover the purchase price of these stocks in no
manner affected the rights of the defendants.
They had no information with respect to this payment. They were dealing entirely with Harper
Strauss & Co., (*as was Hogle with the Badger
Omnibus Account) and they were holding these
securities as the property of Harper Strauss &
Co., and as security for the indebtedness due from
Harper Strauss & Co. to them, and under these
circumstances it is clear that the defendants had a
right to hold such securities until the indebtedness due and owing them from Harper Strauss &
Co. was paid." (*added.)
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Pr.....AI:XTIFF'~ CAsEs ARE NoT IN PoiNT.

Plaintiff devotes a large portion of his brief to a discussion of questions of title in suits between a customer
and his broker. The cases upon which plaintiff relies all
relate to disputes between the cust01ner and the trustee
in bankruptcy, or receiver, or administrator, of the estate
of the customer's broker. That is to say, plaintiff's cases
are suits between Lynch and Badger's estate. No third
party was involved.
Under point one of his brief, plaintiff lists some 17
cases for the proposition that "stocks purchased by a
broker for his client are the property of the client and
title thereto immediately vest in the purchasing client."
As it concerns the equitable title, the proposition of law
cited from these cases is true as between a broker and his
client, but in the instant case we are concerned with a
three party relationship. Lynch had a paramount right
to the stock as between himself and Badger but not a
traceable title which could be asserted to any 40 shares
in Hogle's possession. Plaintiff ignores the completely
negotiable character of the res here involved, to wit the
cashier's check which Lynch delivered to Badger. Quoted
from extensively by plaintiff is Gorman v. Littlefield,
trustee in bankruptcy of Albert 0. Brown, et al, 229 U.S.

19, 57 L. Ed. 1047. There a bankrupt firm of stockbrokers held 350 shares of Green Cananea Copper Company stock in its box. The certificates were endorsed in
blank and no other creditors clai~ed this class of stock.
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Plaintiff had ordered the stockbroker to purchase 250
shares of this stock and had fully paid for it but never
received it. The issue in the case was:
"Are these shares of stock a part of the general estate for the benefit of creditors or should
they be turned over to the claimants 1"
The shares of copper stock which were only claimed
by plaintiff were held not to be a part of the bankrupt
estate for the benefit of general creditors, but were the
.property of the customer. Where there is not sufficient
stock to satisfy claims against that class of stock, the
smne must be prorated mnong all of the stockbroker's
customers. Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874,
28 Atl. 104. The Supreme Court of the United States
held in Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct.
512, 52 L. Ed. 835, that the customer has such an interest
in the stock held by his broker "that a delivery to him by
an insolvent broker is not a preference."
Plaintiff throughout his brief continues to assume
and argue as if he were suing the administrator or a
trustee in bankruptcy, appointed for Badger. But in the
present situation Lynch, a customer of Badger's, is suing
Hogle, the carrying broker, with whom there is no privity
of contract. Neither party knew of the other until after
Badger's death. Plaintiff has not cited a single case sustaining any theory of liability on the part of defendant.
In Barbour v. Sproul, et al, cited and relied upon by
plaintiff, 239 Pa.171, 86 Atl. 714, the Court stated:
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''The sub-brokers (carrying broker) dealt
only with the (initial) broker and not with the
customer, and then had the right to hold all the
stock purchased for the broker until the accounts
had been settled between them and the balance due
had been paid to the former."
Thus a three party relationship is often established
in order to effectuate a customer's purchase order of
New York stocks. The initial broker is the agent of the
cu8tomer. As between the initial broker and the carrying
broker, the initial broker is clothed with the authority of
his principal to· purchase in his (the broker's) name and
to pledge those stocks with the carrying broker in order
to secure the 1narginal balances which may be advanced
by the carrying broker. In Austin v. Hayden, it is stated
at page 322 of Volu1ne 137 N.W. Reporter:
"The relation of the parties is pledgor and
pledgee; the broker's ultimate rights in the stock
being limited to the money he had advanced to
purchase the same, with interest, and his commissions for transacting the business, in which he
is protected by the partial payment the customer
has Inade and the stock which he holds in pledge .
.Jiarkham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 87-!, 28 Atl. 104, 21
L.R.A. 102. Content v. Banner, 184 N.Y. 121, 76
N.E. 913, 6 Ann. Cas. 106; Richardson v. Shaw,
209 U.S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512, 52 L. Ed. 835, 14
Ann. Cas. 981 and cases there cited."
From a study of Austin v. Hayden, (1912) 171 Mich.
'38, 137 N.W. 317, and Korns v. Thomson & JllcKinnon,
2:2 F. Supp. 4-t-2, the Court will see: (1) that plaintiff did
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not own a traceable title to any shares of stock; (2) that
plaintiff entrusted Badger with cash; (3) that before any
stock was ordered out in Lynch's name, Badger misappropriated the credit given to him by Lynch; (4) that
Hogle executed the order to sell in the ordinary course
of busines~, and entirely in good faith, ( 5) that the only
converter in this ea;-;e was Badger not J. A. Hogle & Co.
and ( 6) that Hogle is an innocent pledgee for value.
In Austin v. !!ayden, supra, the initial broker -..vas
Currie & Co. The i~sues were defined as follows (at page
323 of 137 N.W.):
"The customers and owners, by intrusting
their stocks so indorsed to Currie & Co., either by
delivery, or by authorizing their purchase for
them through those channels of trade, invested
Currie & Co., their brokers who were dealing with
the public in that special line, with the indicia
of ownership, thus putting into the hands of such
brokers power to appear as the true owner and
perpetrate the frauds complained of. \V e think
that, under the authorities referred to, the owner
is estopped from asserting paramount interest
against an innocent purchaser, or an innocent
pledgee, who has acquired the stock in the usual
course of trade, for value, without notice and in
good faith."
The Trial Court correctly determined that Hogle
did not know that Badger was in financial difficulties
prior to his death. Hogle made immediate funds available to Badger in the ordinary course of business and
customarily dealt with other brokers in the same manner.
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Badger and J. A. Hogle & Co. were competitors. Certainly, as far as the Lynch transactions were concerned,
Hogle had no rneans of ascertaining who Badger's custonler was that had dealt in Standard Oil of California
stock. Badger would not disclose his customers' names
to J. A. Hogle & Co. In fact, if Hogle had refused to
execute sale orders given to J. A. Hogle & Co. by Badger,
Hogle would have been liable for such refusal. K ryl v.
Pierce, 289 Ill. App. 10, 6 N.E. 2nd 521; Ma.rkham v.
Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Knowlton v. Fitch, 52 N.Y. 288;
.:Ueyer on the La.w of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges,
Sec. 134.
POINT II. DEFENDANT J. A. HOGLE & CO. DEALT
WITH BADGER IN THE NORMAL ARMS-LENGTH BROKERTO-BROKER RELATIONSHIP AND IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS AND ENTIRELY IN GOOD FAITH.

Plaintiff says that the so-called exchange of checks
was in the nature of a "kiting" transaction. Anyone
familiar with the brokerage business would know of
Badger's constant necessity for "Federal funds." For
plaintiff to liken the check transactions between Hogle
and Badger to a "kiting" arrangement is utterly ridiculous. Plaintiff might as well say that if periodically
Z. C. M. I. goes to the First National Bank of Salt Lake
City and draws on its account in that bank by giving the
bank a check for $25,000 and receives in a-x:change from
the bank a cashier's check for use in paying for a draft
covering shipments ordered by Z. C. :NL I., then the First
National Bank and Z. C. M. I. are engaged in a "kiting"
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transaction. r 011 never have a kiting transaction
'trhcre the ]JCrrson. delivering the check is drawing on su,bstantial credits in his account with the other party. In
every instance when J. A. Hogle & Co. gave Badger a
Hogle check, the margin credits in Badger's Omnibus
Account more than covered the check given by Hogle.
In not one single instance during Badger's lifetime did a
check given by Badger to J. A. Hogle and Co. ever come
back unpaid. The one single instance in which Badger's
check "bounced" occurred after Badger's death.
As a broker J. A. Hogle and Co. knew that Badger
must be receiving securities through the Federal Reserve
Bank at Salt Lake City and to obta,in those securities
had to have "Federal funds." If Badger bought stocks
or bonds in Chicago, New York City, or elsewhere, thr
seller would bundle up the securities, attach a sight draft,
and ship the draft and securities to the Federal Reserve
Bank at Salt Lake City. Upon the arrival of the securities, the Bank would notify Badger of the mnount of the
draft. The Bank's rule was that it would not take a check
on any bank but that it must receive "Federal funds"
upon delivery of the securities. Now F'ederal funds would
consist of a draft on the Federal Reserve Bank issued
by a member bank. When ::Mr. Badger would receive the
check of J. A. Hogle and Co., he would take that check
to Walker Bank and Trust Company or to some other
bank in Salt Lake City that was a member of the Federal
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Reserve Ry~h·1n, endorse the check and receive "Federal
funds." :Jlr. Nimnoth testified fully with regard to this
brokerage practice (R. 143 to 145).

'•Q.

A.

* * * \Yith regard to the endorsmnent on the
back of these Hogle checks that state 'For
Federal Reserve drafts' do you know, l\1r.
Xiemoth, whether or not it is the general
practice in the brokerage business for securities to be sent through the Federal Reserve
Bank and for the Federal Reserve Bank to
1nake delivery direct to the broker, but to
demand Federal funds~
Yes it is. It is a daily practice.

Q. It is a daily practice~
A.

Yes sir." (R. 143).

It

i::-; of no consequence that in smne instances the checks
of J. A. Hogle are not marked by Badger "for Federal
funds." :Jlr. Niemoth testified that all shipments of
securities from the East are not sent through the Federal
Reserve Bank, but that they might be sent direct to a
Salt Lake City bank with instructions to deliver the securities upon payment of the draft attached (R. 145).
Badger would need Salt Lake City funds to obtain such
securities. J. A. Hogle & Co.'s duty was to see that the
Omnibus Account was at all times properly margined.
It must be clear from the exhibits covering the Omnibus
Account that Hogle fully discharged that duty and that
any checks given by Hogle to Badger were given in good
faith in the ordinary course of business and within the
margin requirements.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
A ver~· important fact about the manipulation of
funds by Badger is that up until10 days before his death,
Badger always cashed Hogle's check in the Salt Lake
bank on which it was drawn and he customarily endorsed
the checks:
"For Fed. Res. Dft.
Richard C. Badger & Co.
Badger"
During the last 10 days of his life Badger took some
of the Hogle checks direct to Ogden and cashed them in
the First Security Bank (R. 59). Badger told Hogle that
he needed federal funds for picking up drafts through
the Federal Reserve and not until after Badger's death
did J. A. Hogle & Co. receive a bank statement with their
checks returned showing that they had not in fact been
used for this purpose (R. 110). Mr. Maw, plainliff's
witness, testified that Ba.dger "deposited all of Hogle's
checks in the Salt Lake lwnk until the last 1,reek or so of
his life." (R. 48).
If J. A. Hogle & Co. had had any intimation or knowledge that Badger was in financial trouble, would J. A.
Hogle & Co. three days before Badger's death have given
Badger, Hogle's check for Thirty-Two Thousand ($32,000) Dollars (Exhibit 2) and charged that amount
against the Omnibus Account f Would Hogle on :March
24th have accepted Badger's check for Thirty-Four
Thousand ($34,000) Dollars (Exhibit 11) drawn on Badger's account with the First Security Bank at Ogden and
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count for the check if J. ~-\.. liogle & Co. had had any intimation or knowledge that Badger was in financial difficulties 1 Obviously to ask these questions is to answer
thenr..At the tirne of trial J. A. Hogle & Co. had presented its clailn to the Adrninistrator of Badger's estate for
One Hundred Seventy Thousand, One Hundred FortyThree and 38/100 ($170,1±3.58) Dollan:;, and at that time
J. ~-\.. Hogle & Co. held in cash One 1-Iundred Fourtee~
Thousand, Three Hundred Twenty-Five and 25/100
($11±,3:23.:23) Dollars which represented the amount received frmn the sale of the stocks in the Ornnibus Account
(R. 97, 98). The stocks had been sold pursuant to stipulation of J ...:\.. Hogle & Co. and the Administrator of the
estate and under order of the Probate Court administering the estate. This stipulation had been rnade because
all of the interested parties and the Court felt that the
stocks in the Omnibus Account should be liquidated in
order to avoid wide fluctuation in the rnarket value pending the administration of the estate. The stipulation and
the Court Order expressly provide that the proceeds
frmn the sale shall be held by J. A. Hogle & Co. in lieu of
the stocks and subject to the same liens and indebtedness (R. 97). Hogle also held in the account some Park
City Consolidated stock and other odds and ends which
had been pledged by Badger. These stocks were not of
large value. The Park City stock particularly had had a
precipitous decline immediately after Badger's death
(E.xhibit 6-Schedule A-1, & R. 97). The probability
that Hogle will sustain a large loss because of its dealings with Badger further indicates that it had no notice
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that Ba<lger wa~ a crook. Badger perpetrated a fraud
upon the defendants as well as the plaintiff.
As to what constitutes bad faith in this situation of
one stockbrokPr dealing with another, the following quotation from the J(orns case is appropriate. (Page 449 of
22 F. Supp.):

"It is stated in l{ittredge v. Grannis, 244 1\.Y.
168, on page 178, 155 N.E. 88, 91: ':Mere negligence in taking a negotiable instrument is not
enough. Cheever v. Pittsburgh, etc. R.R. Co., 150
N.Y. 59, 44 N.E. 701, 34 L.R.A. 69, 55 Am. St.
Rep. 646. There must be bad faith. Actual notice
on the part of the transferee of the defect in title
is sufficient proof on this point. Less may make
a question of fact. Gross carelessness ( Canajoharie Nat. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N.Y. 191, 25
N.E. 402, 10 L.R.A. 676), knowledge of facts that
would create suspicion in the mind of a prudent
man (Seybel v. Nat. Currency Bank, 54 N.Y. 288,
13 Am. Rep. 583), circumstances that otherwise
fairly raise the question of his bad faith and create
reasonable grounds for suspecting his conduct in
the transaction (American Ex. Nat. Bank v. N.Y.
Belting, etc. Company, 148 N.Y. 698, 43 N.E. 168;
Second Nat. Bank v. Weston, 172 N.Y. 250,64 N.E.
949), permit the inference that his conduct was
not innocent.'"
Plaintiff contends that because Badger dealt with
Hogle through an Omnibus Account, Hogle knew that
Badger was acting as agent for some customer of his,
and from this premise it is implied that Hogle should
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not haYe carried out orders to sell. The same contention
was discussed in the Korns case and detennined to be
without n1erit.

.. It 1nay be true that the defendants knew that
Harper ~trauss & Co. was giving these orders for
the purchase of stock on behalf of other people,
but, as was stated in Willard v. White, 56 Hun
3S1, 10 X.Y.S. 170, 173, 'what other people, or who
they were,' or whether in fact Harper Strauss &
Co. was operating on its o1vn account, 'they had
no 1neans of knowing and no reason to surmise.'
The defendants were dealing with Harper Strauss
& Co., and with it alone, and they looked to Harper Strauss & Co. for the payment of its account,
and held these securities, received by purchase by
them for Harper Strauss & Co., as security therefor."
The principle of equitable estoppel which governs
the disposition of this case was discussed and applied
by this Court in Garfield Banking Co. v. Argyle, 64 U tab
572, :23:2 Pac. 5-!1. The case is cited in an extensive annotation on the subject at 73 A.L.R. page 1409 and its holding is embodied in this quotation (P. 576 of 64 Utah) :
'"\Vhen she indorsed her stock certificate in
blank and delivered it to the defendant Argyle,
she invested him with all the indicia of title and
ownership, and if he abused the confidence reposed in him and appellant suffered a loss, she,
and not the plaintiff, must bear such loss."
This language fully answers plaintiff's contention at page
21 of Lynch's brief, that neither "Badger nor anyone
else had authority to sell, pledge or in any way handle
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the stock purchased for Lynch except to order its transfer and delivery to him." As pointed out in the Argyle
and the Korns case~, supra, Lynch clothed Badger with
indicia of ownership and, therefore Lynch is equitably
ei-itopped from denying that his agent, Badger, had authority to aet for him. See also Brou·n v. Wright, 48
Utah 633, 1()1 PaC'. 4-1-S; Adams v. SiZ,rer Shield Mining
and 1ll ill ing Co. et al, s~ rtah 58(i, 21 P. 2d 886; and
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork 'C. Spanish Fork Irr.
Co., lOIUtah 219, 1:l2 P. 2d 5-t-7.
If plaintiff would acknowledge the role that Badger
played in this case it would be unnecessary for him to cite
and confui-ie in his brief "a number of brokerage bankruptcy cases u-lzich discuss inconceivably complicated
situations! . . . " (Page 25, appellant's brief). Plaintiff
relies on the decision in Pippey's Appeal (In reT. A. McIntyre & Co., 181 Fed. 955) ·which discusses the doctrine
of equitable estoppel and concludes that because the repledgee did not sell the initial broker's customer's stoek
but still held it in its hands, (the stock was registered
in the customer's name) the re-pledgee had not given
value for the stock and therefore was not a B.F.P. for
ralu.e. \Yhen Hogle executed the order to sell, it credited
the Omnibus Account with the proceeds and thereby gave
value to Badger. Hogle did not convert the stock to its
own use. Other than the commission which it charged
Badger, J. A. Hogle & Co. obtained no benefit from the
transaction. Hogle certainly has not been unjustly enriched as claimed by plaintiff.
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In Austin c. Hayden, 171 :Jlich. ~~~' 137 N.W. 317,
the ~uprmne Court of :Jlichigan affinned the Trial
Court's finding of fact that Hayden Stone & Co. (the
Xew York broker) was not a bona fide purchaser of
Currie & Co.'s customer's stocks after June ~3, 1908,
on which date the defendant had an opportunity to study
an audit of Currie & Co. (the initial broker) which it
made in connection with taking over certain of Currie
& Co.'s accounts. The audit revealed the fraudulent discrepancies committed by Currie & Co. After said date
the Court found that the defendant carrying broker and
the initial broker were "playing the gmne together" and
that defendant ceased to be an innocent party dealing in
good faith; that thereafter it becan1e a rnatter of si1nple
agency between the two brokerage firms, unprotected
by equitable estoppel or the usages and customs of the
:-..;tock :&whange. Comparison with this fascinating 1fichigan decision will lead this Court to affirm the Trial
Court's determination that Hogle had no knowledge of
Badger's fraudulent activities.
One or two other matters mentioned in pJaintiff's
brief need clarification. Plaintiff states that because
Badger died on ~larch 27th and the normal settlement
date for the 50 share sale transaction that occurred on
:Jlarch :2-!th would be the 28th (three full business days
after trade date, R. 10-!) - "No settlement was ever
made." (Page 30 appellant's brief) The settle1nent date
is the date at which time payment for a purchase order
must be con1pleted (R. 82). It means that Hogle must
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have the marginal requirement satisfied on that date (R.
104). rrhis lapSP of three days gives the bookkeeping department time to compute the balance in the customer's
account and the statement made by plaintiff is erroneous.
Hogle's New York Office sold 50 shares of Standard
Oil of California on l\larch 24th, the date it was directed
to do so hy Badger. The sale was fully consummated
l\Iarch 24th. All that remained to be done on l\farch
:2Sth wa~ to deliver 50 shares in street certificates to
the purchasing K ew York broker and credit Badger's
Omnibus Account. These things were done. Settlement
was made.
STOCKBROKERS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE

\Ve do not intend to \\Tite a text on the stock brokerage business and the control of credit by the Federal
Reserve but these matters were testified to extensively
by Mr. Nie1noth, cashier for J. A. Hogle & Co. (R. 138,
139 & 15-t). For those members of the Court who may be
interested, the following is set forth:
(a) An Omnibus Account. Badger maintained
with J. A. Hogle & Co. an Omnibus Account. This account embraced transactions of J. A. Hogle & Co. for
Badger relating to New York stocks. These transactions were regulated by the Rules of the New York Stock
Exchange and of the Federal Reserve Board. The
broker, Badger, was required in the Omnibus Account to
1naintain a margin such that at no time did the indebtedness of the account e...xceed seventy-five per cent (75%)
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of the value of the securities in the account (R. 175).
For exan1ple, if on a particular day there were in the
account securities of a value of Four Hundred Thousand
($±00,000) Dollars, (the value being based upon the
1narket that day), then Badger was entitled to borrow on
the account not to exceed Three Hundred Thousand
($300,000) Dollars. In other words, the Omnibus Account was n1ade up of two general compilations, (E~~
hibits G & H) i.e. (1) a description of the securities in
the account and (2) an itemization of the amounts borrmved by Badger against those securities (R. 128). The
securities were pledged to secure the payment of the
anwunt that Hogle had loaned to Badger in the account.

The securities were not in Badger's name nor in the
name of any of his customers bw.t were in the name of
J. A. Hogle & Co. The physical possession of the certi-

ficates was in Hogle. If the securities in the account increased in value as 1neasured by the quotations of the
New York Stock Exchange then to the extent of seventyfive (75%) per cent of .that increase, Badger was free
to borrow additional money and on the other hand if the
securities decreased in value to a point where the amount
owed by Badger in the account \vas more than seventyfive (75%) per cent of the then 1narket value of the securities Badger would be required to further secure the
account either by the deposit of 1noney or additional
securities. In those instances where the account was e&
cessively margined, Badger was free to draw in 1noney
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the exc<·~:-' so long a~ the indebtedness against the account
did not exceed seventy-five (75o/o) per cent of the value
of the securities in the account.
(b) The Federal Reserve. Congress has vested
in the Federal Reserve Board the control of credit. By
fixing tT1e re-discount rate for banks and the margin requirements of brokers in stock transactions, the Federal
Reserve is able to expand or restrict credit as the country's necessities requin·. The enormous sums of money
required in the day-to-day transactions of stockbrokers
is well known. The stock market crash of 1929 showed
Congress that some control of margin requirmnents was
1nandatory if the country was to have a stable economy.
Through the Securities and E.-x:change Commission and
the Commission's control of stock exchanges, and through
the powers vested in the Federal R-eserve Board, this
control is obtained. Stockbrokers not only deal in stocks
but deal in money as well. They, like banks, charge interest on their cust01ners' borrowings and are under the
direct control of the Federal Reserve as to the adequacy
of the securities pledged with the brokers. A change in
the margin requirements can make a change in the economy of the entire nation because of the large amounts of
money required to finance brokerage transactions. For
these reasons the Federal Reserve has promulgated
Regulation "T" (Exhibit 7) entitled-"Extension. and
Ma,in.tenance of Credit by Brokers, Dealers and Members
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of Sational Securities R.rclwngcs." This Regulation
~pecifically covers On1nibus Accounts and the time for
immediate credit entries in the account.
(c) U ruler Regulation '· T" brokers may give tmmedia.te credit in an account even though the check has
not in due course cleared. The Federal Reserve Board
has recognized that transactions on the stock market
must be consummated im1nediately otherwise the business will break down. Enormous changes can be made in .
an hour's time and there must be a finality to each transaction the n1oment it is made. To pennit this making of
immediate credit the Federal Reserve has adopted the
following rule:

"(F) Time of receipt of funds, or securities. F·or the purposes of this regulation, a
creditor Inay, at his option (1) treat the
receipt in good faith of any check or draft
drawn on a bank which in the ordinary
cours.e of business is payable on presentation, or any order on a savings bank with
passbook attached which is so payable, as
receipt of payment of the amonnt of such
check, draft or order; (2) Treat the shipment of securities in good faith with sight
draft attached as receipt of payment of the
amount of such sight draft; and (3) In the
case of receipt in good faith of written or
telegraphic notice in connection w~th a special Omnibus Account of a customer not
located in the same city, that a specified
security, or a check or a draft has been dispatched to the creditor, treat the receipt of
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such notice as receipt of such secud ty,
check or draft; provided, however, that if
the creditor receives notice that such check,
draft, order or sight draft described in
clause (1), (2) or (3) is not paid on the
day of presentation, or if such security,
check or draft described in clause (3) is not
received by the creditor within a reasonable time, the creditor shall promptly take
such action as he would have been required
to take by the appropriate provisions of
this regulation if the provisions of this subsection had not been utilized." (See Exhibit
7 - Regulation "T", pages 13 and 14.)
Mr. Niemoth \\~as examined ·with respect to Regulation
"T" and the matter of giving credit for checks before
they had cleared, and in thi~ connection the witness said:
(SeeR. 17-± & 17rl)

"Q.

Now :Mr. Niemoth, state whether or not as a
general practice in the brokerage business
that if, for example, Hogle should receive a
telegram from New York to the effect that
a check has been mailed * * * * mailed by a
New York broker with whmn Hogle does business, mailed to the Salt Lake Office of Hogle,
under the Regulation that I have just read
to you, you aren't entitled to treat and do
treat that communication, you are entitled to
treat it as receipt of those funds, even though
the check is not at the time in your hands?

A.

Tnat is correct.

Q.

Now state whether or not it is necesary, in
the ordinary course of the brokerage busi-
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ne~~, that there be irnn1ediate credit given for
all of these transactions and that they not
be delayed because of the clearance that ordinarily would result in business~

A.

It i~ necessary that they be given immediate
credit.

Q. Do you know whether or not J. A. Hogle & Co.
itself, in its transactions, that it has had with
brokers in New York, has received credit and
does receive credit generally upon some written or telegraphic com1nunication that this
in:::trument is on its way~
A.

Yes, they do.
*

* * * *

(R. 1-!7 & 148)

Q. Do you know whether or not there is anything in that Regulation that relates to the
giving of immediate credit for checks, even
though they are drawn on out-of-town banks~
~\.

Yes there is.

Q. Is it fair to state, :Jir. :Nienwth, that the
brokerage business embraces not only transactions in securities but transactions in
1noney, and that money is borrowed and loans
made as a general part of the business~
A.

Yes it is.

Q. State whether or not interest is charged on
those loans by the
A.

brokers~

Oh yes, interest is charged.
THE COURT: Those loans only pertain to
stocks and securities, do they not1
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A.

That is correct. That is correct."

(d) The Onmilms Account of Badger tras always
more than adequately margined pursuant to the requirements of the E:rchanrJe and the Federal Reserve Board.
Hogle's primary duty was to see that the value of the
securitie~ in the Omnibus Account more than met the
margin requirements of the Federal Reserve Board and
of the New York Stock Exchange when compared with

the indebtedness owed by Badger in the account. In
order to show progressively the status of the Omnibus
Account and the fact that Hogle had every reason to
believe that Badger was solvent and acting in good faith
and in acordance with rules of the Board and the

E~

change, the defendants prepared a series of exhibits
showing periodically the status of the account. (Exhibits
12 to 16 inclusive). :Mr. Niemoth testified that he had
not picked arbitrary dates in the preparation of the
exhibits, but had selected dates which themselves show
reports were being made to Badger in the ordinary
course of business (R. 135). Transaction after transaction was covered by :Mr. Niemoth with reference to
the exhibits (R. 135 to 143 inclusive). We will not cover
this in detail but to summarize Mr. Niemoth's testimony,
it is to the effect and uncontradicted that the Omnibus
Account of Badger was at all times properly margined
and that Badger could have drawn from the account more.
money than he in fact did draw; that this was true even
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though there is taken into the accounting the $34,000
check of Badger which was returned to J. A. Hogle & Co.
after Badger\~ death 1narked "maker deceased, insufficient funds:~ (R. 143).
LYxcH ~~L\DE CLADI FOR THE RETGR~ oF

His

:\Io~EY FRoM

THE BADGER EsTATE.

Because of the overwhelming evidence against
Lynch's contentions in this case, the fact that Lynch
has filed a clain1 \Yith the ad1uinistrator of Badger's
estate for the return of Lynch's 1noney Inay not be
important. It was stipulated, however, (R. :26) that the
plaintiff filed a clai1n with George C. ~law, Administrator of the estate of Richard C. Badger, deceased, for
$1,793.45 and that the claim has been allowed by the

administrator. The attempt in this litigation of Lynch
to saddle his loss upon J. A. Hogle & Co. is an afterthought and was made when it becmne aprmrent to Lynch
that the Badger estate was insolvent. Lynch is in no
better position than scores of other custmners of Badger
who trusted Badger and who unfortunately did not discover Badger's defalcations until it was too late.
THE UTAH STATUTES

Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act as adopted
in Utah, title to a certificate can only be acquired in the
following 1nanner:
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16-3-1 U.C.A. 1953
"Title to a certificate and to the ~hares represented thereby can be transferred only:
(1) By delivery of the certificate endorsed either

in blank or to a specified person by the person appearing by the certificate to be the
owner of the shares represented thereby; or
(2) By delivE'ry of the certificate and a separate
document containing a written assignment of
the certificate or a power of attorney to sell,
assign or transfer the same or the shares
represented thereby ... "
Title to the stock was never transferred to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was simply the owner of the right to obtain the
stocks once they were "ordered out." This order was
never given to Hogle and plaintiff must bear the loss
because of his misplaced trust in Badger. Plaintiff's
equitable ownership was cut off by his clothing of Badger
with the indicia of ov1nership under the principle of
equitable estoppel. It was at all times subordinate to the
pledge to J. A. Hogle & Co.
Because the facts of this case do not sustain any
theory of liability on the part of the defendant, J. A.·
Hogle & Co., the cases cited by plaintiff in reality are
authority for the contentions and position of the defendant. Thus in several of plaintiff's cases, it is pointed out
that the broker (Badger) is the agent of the customer
(Lynch). Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct.

512, 52 L. Ed. 835; Skiff v. Stodda,rd, 63 Conn. 198, 26
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~U earns,

262 Fed. 607. Badger
was not the agent of J. A. Hogle & Co., Holman u. Goslin,

.Atl. 87 4; Tuckerman r.
93 N.Y.S. 126.
~\!though

the

r niform

Stock Transfer Act deals

with stock certificates once they come into existence as
:3hares Tegistered in their ou·ner's na.me, this same principle of equitable e::;toppel which protects bona fide purchasers for value is expressed in the Utah statutes.

16-3-7
" ... If the delivery of a certificate was made:
(3) Without authority from the owner; .... The
possession of the certificate may be reclaimed and
the transfer thereof rescinded, unless-( a) The
certificate has been transferred to a purchaser for
value in good faith without notice of any facts
making the transfer wrongful. ... "
16-3-8

''Bona fide purchasers for value protected.Although the transfer of a certificate or of shares
represented thereby has been rescinded or set
aside, nevertheless, if the transferee has possession of the certificate or of a new certificate representing part or the whole of the same shares of
stock, a subsequent transfer of such certificate by
the transferee, mediately or immediately, to a
purchaser for value in good faith, without notice
of any facts making the transfer wrongful, shall
give such purchaser an indefeasible right to the
certificate and the shares represented thereby."
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This is the decisive issue. Did Hogle have any knowledge that Badger acted fraudulently~ Did II ogle act in
good faith when it carried out Badger's instructions~ The
Trial Court determined that there was no collusion nor
participation by J. A. Hogle & Co. in the fraud nor was
there any notice of facts and circumstances calculated to
put an ordinar;r prudent business man on inquiry. The
facts completely sustain the Trial Court's Finding No.
12 to the effect that plaintiff's loss did not result "from
any act or neglect of defendants" and that defendants
"had no knowledge that Richard C. Badger or the firm
of Richard C. Badger & Co. \\·as in financial difficulties
prior to the time that Badger died on ~farch 27, 1951."
CONCLUSION
\Vhen Lynch on

~Iarch

16 endorsed the cashier's

check (Exhibit A) of Commercial Security Bank, payable
to Lynch for $1,793.45, and handed the check .to Badger,
Lynch delivered a negotiable instrun1ent and set in
motion the means whereby Badger could defraud him.
Lynch did this nowithstanding the fact that in previous
transactions Badger had been unusually slow in delivering the securities Lynch had ordered and paid for. In
the case of the General .i\fotors stock, Badger had stalled
Lynch with one excuse or another for almost three
months. The statement of the F·ederal Court in the
Korns case is particularly apt here -

"The stocks and

securities never became the property of the plaintiff.
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There wa:5 a conversion oy Harper Strauss & Co. (the
initial broker) of the 1noneys which had been paid to that
company by the plaintiff and his assignors for the purchase of the stocks." The burden zras upon Lynch, to
prove that J . ..:\.. Hogle & Co. converted Lynch's stock.
This Lynch failed to do. The Trial Court found the facts
against Lynch and there is ample evidence to sustain
those findings. The judgment entered by District Judge
Ray Van Cott, Jr., in favor of the defendants should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
1IARR, WILKINS & CANNON,
G. A.1IARR,
C. W. WILKINS,
RICHARD H. NEBEKER,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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